Introduction
The Mexican reform consists of the transfer of resources, responsibilities and prerogatives.
However, it is not devolution (the permanent transfer of authority), delegation (the temporary transfer of authority) or deconcentration (the transfer of work but no authority).
Rather, as will be demonstrated, the Mexican reform is a curious combination of all three types of decentralization (Hanson, 1997, p. 5) .
The objectives of this paper are to respond to the following research questions:
n What were the stated and unstated motives behind the federal government's decision to decentralize education?
n In what political and historical framework was the decentralization of education introduced?
n What is the new institutional model of decentralization, and what is decentralized?
n Were there any major shifts in power from the center to the 31 states?
n What are the outcomes of the decentralization at the local level?
The signature of the Agreement between the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP), the National Teachers Union (SNTE), and the governors of the 31 states set the essential conditions for the transfer. To give legal form to the new structure of the Mexican educational system, the Federal Congress reformed Article Three of the Constitution in 1992 and approved the General Law of Education (GLE) in 1993. The underlying goal found in these documents identifies the expectation that through decentralization federalism will be strengthened and consequently raise the quality of, and equity in, education. The endorsement of the Agreement by government agencies was no surprise because the State policy toward decentralization was announced as far back as 1982 (De la Madrid, 1982) . What was a surprise is that my research discovered no information that the 31 states were preparing themselves at the time to take control of the educational system. This fact suggests that the transfer of education was a part of federal policy alone rather than policy of the 31 states. In addition, at the time political and social demands for decentralization were not evident. Nor was the teachers' union demanding such a policy change --quite the contrary. This lack of social pressure for educational decentralization suggests that the leaders in the federal government had other hidden motives.
The Mexican framework of decentralization (also called federalization in many documents and official speeches) adopts no extreme positions. It is a model in which the central State maintains the power to dictate general, nation-wide norms for the overall system. This power covers the elaboration of the national curriculum and the approval of regional curricula, the evaluation of the system, and the channeling of compensatory and extraordinary resources to poor states. The states assume responsibility for labor relations, school management and the administration of other reforms decided in SEP.
Possible reasons to decentralize
In 1982, President de la Madrid announced the transfer of education to the states in his inaugural address. He contended that it was a part of the decentralization of national life policy (De la Madrid, 1982) . The expressed goals were to increase the quality of education and to provide more educational opportunities to the poor. Yet, providing good education to the masses has been the aim of the Mexican government since 1921 when revolutionary groups created SEP (Ornelas, 1995 ) so that additional explanations need to be explored.
The federalist hypothesis
In their pronouncements, President de la Madrid and his First Secretary of Public Education, Reyes Heroles, emphasize federalism and constitutional law as the principal motives for the decentralization of education. The federalist hypothesis therefore refers to the aims of the dominant political party (PRI) to recover the original spirit of the Constitution with claims that the decentralization of education and national life is a step forward in democratizing Mexican political and social institutions (Reyes Heroles,1985, p.74 ).
According to one author (Gil Villegas, 1986, pp. 36-37) , none of the major political theorists (de Tocqeville, Mill and Weber) who deal with the issues of democracy and the dichotomy between centralization and decentralization, drew clear relationships between federalism, on the one hand, and democracy and decentralization, on the other.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis can not be rejected completely. The political discourse of the nations' leadership has had an impact on changing legislation, transferring responsibilities to state governments, and implementing educational policies in many states.
The "efficiency" argument
For decades, the centralization of the educational system under SEP meant the increased concentration of power and decision making at the central bureaucratic level. SEP exercised power through a pyramidal authority structure in which authoritative decisions were made at the top and projected downward through a complex hierarchical institutional framework.
In 1982, new leadership began to enter senior management positions in SEP and soon demonstrated an interest in improving organizational performance. Pressures for "increased efficiency" began to build slowly with the ultimate aim of dismantling gradually the huge and burdensome bureaucratic apparatus. The belief was that greater efficiency would result in decisions made at the local level that were based on reliable information and a precise political understanding of local conditions (McGinn and Street, 1986 ).
However, even with the presence of some highly placed reformers, the Mexican decentralization reform advanced slowly for the next 10 years. There is little evidence to suggest that the Secretariat of Education, as an organization made up of many levels of bureaucracy, had the political will to give up significant measures of authority. This may help to explain why SEP still monitors all decentralization trends.
Breaking up the teachers' union
The growth and expansion of SEP and its administrative apparatus gave birth to the national teachers' union (SNTE) in 1943. Previously, teachers and other education workers were organized in a host of small unions with many conflicts and rivalries. In some of these unions the Communist Party and other left-wing organizations exercised leadership. The creation of SNTE had two implications. First, the absorption of the union within the dominant political party (PRI) gradually diminished the seeds of dissidence between the union and the government. Second, it allowed SEP to carry out educational policies across the country without having to combat a multitude of small teachers' unions.
Salaries, fringe benefits, promotion and other teachers' issues could now be negotiated at the central offices of the federal government in Mexico City. The power of the National Executive Committee of SNTE was strengthened, not only because it collected membership fees, but also because its bargaining position with SEP included almost all major issues including salaries, recruitment, teacher postings, and management of the career roster. However, through the years homogeneous groups (with maffia-like tendencies) got hold of the leadership positions and made careers as State officials within SEP (Benavides and Velasco, 1993) . SNTE argued that the real reason behind the decentralization of education was to break apart the union and to denationalize education. This "dismantling" thesis, although very suggestive for political analysis, is not completely satisfactory. SNTE has been an effective vote producing organization during elections, and it is unlikely that the political party in power (PRI) would want to dismantle it. Therefore, it could be argued that the State objective in decentralizing education was not to demolish SNTE, but merely to design of a new corporatist pact in which the government would play a more dominant role.
Decentralization of conflict
The increasing complexity of the concentration of power in the national committee of SNTE, caused other conflicts in the political domain. During the late 70's and early 80's, many resources were channeled into the educational system. SEP´s cumbersome bureaucratic structure was not capable of responding to the speedy incorporation of so many new teachers. Paperwork was slow, newly employed teachers were paid several months late, and SEP officials were unresponsive to teachers' demands for higher compensation for working in rural areas. Very soon complaints and protests among teachers began. The union leadership neither organized nor led the teachers in their demands, but instead sought to control them and put down protests. Teacher turmoil over unresolved problems and the SNTE's role in suppressing their demands were at the bottom of a growing dissent movement. The result was that by 1981, independent forces (from left -wing political parties and groups) organized protests and through democratic union elections won the leadership of SNTE's sections in Chiapas, Oaxaca, and later in Mexico City. A political presence was thus provided in these parts of the country (Fuentes, 1983, pp. 100-145) .
This thesis suggests the motive behind the decentralization of education was the State´s attempts to cope with growing dissidence among teachers, and other types of political conflict at the local level. If the system is decentralized, it was argued, confining the dissidents to those states where they already had positions and thus preventing the organization of a national left-wing teachers' organization would be possible. Although a national dissident group, Coordination of Education Workers (CNTE), was created before the 1992 Agreement was signed, so far it has been unable to grow. SNTE's political shifts and the containment of the conflicts to specific localities may be the reason.
Dependency and international influence
For many years the World Bank and its economic policies towards government loans has been at the epicenter of decentralization reforms worldwide. According to the economic dependency view, the Mexican government, as a condition of acquiring additional loans, has agreed to pursue a policy of educational decentralization because it is consistent with the World Bank's neoliberal economic views. (Winkler and Rounds, 1993) . However, granted that the World Bank possesses a certain degree of policy influence, it would be incorrect to overemphasize this type of economic determinism because it ignores the complexity of the Mexican economy and political structure.
None of the theses presented can alone explain the driving force behind the decentralization of education in Mexico, but together they provide an explanation of the multiple motives pressing the federal government into action.
Political and historical background
The decentralization of education is part of a turn around in Mexico's economy and Everything turned national: the National Teachers College, the National Institute for Teachers Training, the national unitary curricula, national free textbooks and, of course, a national unified system of education. The expansion of primary, secondary and distance education was more rapid than before, but attention to urban areas was the main priority. SEP extended its authority over education while the 31 state governments remained stagnant (Ornelas, 1997a) .
The federal government launched a policy of administrative deconcentration in 1978 to improve management and to expand basic education to remote areas. The Secretary of Public Education instituted thirty-one delegations, one in each state. Each delegation put under its single command more than fifteen federal offices. Many of them soon came under direct rule of SNTE officials. In addition, each delegation had to collect basic data, do the planning at the state and regional levels, and be in charge of new personnel hiring. The head of the delegation was the personal representative of the Federal Secretary of Education in the state and consequently played a major political role. SNTE opposed this policy because it was seen as a takeover of some areas under its direct control, mainly in basic education (Prawda,1987, pp. 215-251) . While administrative deconcentration of tasks was the last endeavor of the federal government to maintain a centralized system, it also was a step forward toward decentralization. 
The new institutional model and power shifts
The Salinas administration (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) Nevertheless, the SNTE leadership was dominated by a single political group still opposed to educational decentralization, so the government acted to get rid of them. In March and April of 1989, the Salinas administration supported the struggle of the dissent factions within SNTE that demanded better salaries and labor democracy. That confrontation produced new, more flexible leadership within SNTE that resulted in an agreement to decentralize as part of a package of union benefits (Benavides, 1993) .
The powerful teachers' union finally agreed to accept the decentralization of the basic education system when the federal government bundled the policy with increases in wages for teachers, economic incentives to improve quality of instruction, new schemes to promote upward mobility, and the President's assurance that this strategy would not dismantle SNTE. These were clear benefits for the teachers' guild. The President and the Secretary of Education exhibited the Agreement as the revamp of the federalist aims put in the Constitution but never enforced. The federal government completed the package by promising state governors that, if economic conditions permitted, it would maintain and increase the financial resources allocated to each state to manage education. Moreover, the federal government would maintain and expand some national programs to compensate poor regions the most (Moctezuma, 1994) . Table 1 shows the jurisdictions of the federal and of state governments, and those that both administrations share. Table 1 about here The federal government also negotiated with the state governors to accept the proposed transfer of responsibilities. Given the strong centralist and presidentialist political system and the subordinate role the governors possessed, none of them protested, at least for the public record. Some of them suspected that the decentralization of education meant the transfer of additional management tasks from the national to the state level along with conflict with a powerful teachers' union or dissent factions, but with no additional resources. To counter this belief, the federal government bundled decentralization of education with the promise that the states would receive the same resources as before (and more) to manage the educational system. Even, this point was stated in the General Education Law, Article 27.
As can be seen in Table 1 , within the new institutional model the central government has power to "determine," "norm," "regulate," "evaluate," "ascertain general guidelines," and requires local governments to channel resources to education when, in theory, each state congress is sovereign to fix public expenses for those schools in its jurisdiction. The states, according to this New Federalism, "provide educational services," "adjust calendars to local needs," and "are to be responsible for labor relations with SNTE," which retains its national structure. In brief, with this model of decentralization, SEP continues its control over the major policy decisions while the states are assigned the responsibility for carrying out tasks, but within central government guidelines. In other words, there has been a decentralization of management functions, but a centralization of decision-making power. For this reason, one can hypothesize that the institutional changes promoted by the decentralization of education do not attempt to dismantle the corporatist pact between the State and the teachers' union but only improve its operational characteristics.
Centralism, according to the Agreement, separated educational authorities from communities, created perverse routines that had adverse effects on educational quality, and nobody was accountable to society. So, through decentralization, the federal government expected that states would play new roles, local authorities would introduce new practices at the state level, and parents and other segments of society would know who is responsible for public education. The Agreement introduced the seeds of accountability, which, however, are not yet enforced.
Within the new institutions at the state level, new routines emerged and actors play new roles. Nowadays, the state officials are in charge of day-to-day operations. They have to resolve problems that they used to transfer to far away authorities in Mexico City, such as lack of school facilities in a zone. These educational managers are in close contact with parent associations, community leaders, and with the local press that is taking more interest in educational affairs. Moreover, the governors expect to play roles that were previously left to the federal Secretary of Education. For example, in Nuevo León, 1997 was an election year when a new governor, mayors and congress were elected. In the political campaigns, education was an important subject of debate because the candidates expected to play new leadership roles in the local educational systems. In previous local campaigns, education was a matter of rhetoric and seldom mentioned. (This and subsequent paragraphs are based on my 1999 field notes.)
With the passage of the General Education Law in 1993, the local educational authorities have been assuming new responsibilities, such as: planning, hiring new staff, devising educational innovations, organizing new supervising functions, launching inservice programs for teachers, creating infrastructure, publishing books or journals (either for teachers or the public at large), and managing large sums of money. They are also responsible to local congresses for executing educational policies and managing relationships with SEP and other institutions. However, an overall evaluation of the system and of student achievement has not yet been done, and so accountability is still forthcoming.
In sum, the Mexican decentralization reform saw power shifts take place in opposite directions. First, the federal government, through SEP, centralized additional control over educational policy. Second, the states received additional responsibilities for school management as local officials began to carry out tasks associated with their new responsibilities, such as managing financial resources.
The Agreement between the Secretary of Public Education, SNTE's leadership and the state governors has to be enforced by a myriad of intermediate actors at the state level.
Although beforehand the secretaries of education (or director generals) in the states managed a significant part of the local budget, their posts were not of great importance.
Nowadays, in many states they are the most powerful individuals after the governor. They administer the largest portion of the state budget, although most of it is for the payroll, and at times they manage labor relations with three SNTE sections and other small unions. The relevance of the post is such that successful public servants and professional politicians compete for them. The new roles demand energy, skill, and the interpersonal attributes to manage conflict. Also, SNTE section leaders became key actors for launching and starting the new rules of the game at state level.
After the decentralization process began, the structures and management processes began to change in different ways at the state level. In the states of Nuevo León and Oaxaca, for example, they execute very different activities. In Nuevo Leon, the state government decided that their cadres should manage the federal transfer within the existing educational structures by simply upgrading their responsibilities. In Oaxaca, the government decided to create a decentralized institute to manage education, without creating a state secretary. So, in Nuevo León, the Department of Education became a large institution with four under secretaries and 15 deconcentrated offices. The secretary of education is now a powerful institution that deals with two SNTE sections, manages a transferred budget from the federal government of close to 180 million dollars (in 1996), supervises 35 thousand teachers, and administers 4, 650 basic education schools with 762 thousand students enrolled. Whereas in Oaxaca, the governor transformed the former coordinated services into the State Institute for Education, under a general director. This official has a more problematic situation because Section 22 of SNTE is led by a left-wing group and its membership is highly politicized. The federal government channeled more than 290 million dollars, to support 9,400 schools with 37,000 teachers and 921 thousand students enrolled. The State of Nuevo León spends almost 30% of its own budget on education while Oaxaca's government spends 1.9%. The federal government plays a compensating role by providing Oaxaca more than double the financial resources that go to Nuevo León (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1999).
The union section leadership also plays different roles. In Nuevo León, the leaders of sections 21 and 50, after an intense conflict over pension funds in 1993, chose to bargain in peaceful terms with the local authorities, and to arrange that an increase in new teaching posts should be proportional to the sections' size. In Oaxaca, Section 22 leadership opposed decentralization but bargained with local authorities to appoint five top officers to the Oaxaca Institute of Education. Thus, the union membership elects the administrators who will be in charge of managing basic education services. Union members campaign to win these positions and promise to serve faithfully their teacher guild and to be loyal to the section's leadership. However, the role of these "elected public servants" tends to be unstable. Typically, they do not achieve the confidence of the other government authorities, and gradually lose the trust of their teacher constituency because, eventually, they have to act as authorities.
The new SEP
Before decentralization, the SEP administrators were managers of extraordinarily complex and powerful bureaucratic machinery. They would decide who was to be hired and where, administered the payroll of almost 650,000 teachers and other workers, created and controlled a file for each public educational worker in the nation that contained an enormous amount of data. Everything came from Mexico City. Each director general controlled a legion of workers whose mission was to control a legion of other workers.
After decentralizing, in the central offices of the federal government many officials changed their roles and routines. The undersecretary for Basic Education no longer manages personnel. Director generals, who report to the undersecretary, are now typically scholars or teachers (on leave from their institutions) who define curricula, prepare textbooks, set rules for special education and for bicultural education, design reforms of basic education and teachers training institutions (Pardo, 1999) .
Political and administrative outcomes
With the arrival of educational decentralization in Mexico, there were winners and losers.
The biggest losers were Mexico City bureaucrats who used to have control of almost everything in the educational system. These bureaucrats who are often critics of the reform say that the Agreement was just a federalist revamp, another example of the reformist tendencies of the Mexican State. Other losers were those individuals who anticipated that the SNTE would lose its powerful influence throughout the educational system.
In fact, SNTE was the immediate winner. First, it maintains its national structure and many corporatist features, among them the control of membership fees (one percent of the basic salaries of more than one million teachers and other workers). Second, SNTE still negotiates with SEP salaries and fringe benefits for all basic education teachers, including those who do not belong to this union. Third, SNTE's leadership still has a national political stature with more power than many governors. Finally, in a given situation, SNTE can exercise pressure on a state government in two directions: at the local level mobilizing as many union sections as exist in the state, and at the national scale through pressure on SEP, the Finance Ministry to other departments of the federal government. SNTE's role and routines have not changed dramatically, although there are indications that many sections in the various states would like more independence from the National Executive Committee. (Ornelas, field notes) Signing the Agreement represented a triumph for the federal government that culminated 10 years of an erratic policy. The federal government increased its legitimacy in the public eye, weakened by so many other failed policies. Besides these substantive accomplishments, SEP also redefined its role. Now it sets policy, supervises, defines issues, determines and evaluates most educational undertakings, but does not manage the routine operations of the system. The governors are also winners to some degree because they can now play a more active role in managing the educational system in their states. They are in charge of handling a huge sum of money in the budget, appointing and removing principal educational officials, and managing labor relations. Thus, from being passive actors with few or any educational responsibilities in the recent past, the state governments now manage the day-to-day operations of the system and resolve basic problems. However, clear limits to authority exist because the federal government has the authority to supervise how the states spend resources allocated to education. However, in practice, no genuine accountability exists for educational outcomes.
Teachers are also winners. The federal government has so far honored its commitment of the 1992 Agreement to increase teacher salaries and other benefits. The basic monthly salary of a beginning teacher in the Mexico City area, for instance, rose 56% in real terms from December 1988 to December 1992. It decreased 8% prior to December 1997 due to the economic crisis of 1995 when the GNP fell almost 7%. Nevertheless, since 1992, teachers have another benefit: a scheme of incentives (Carrera Magisterial) with a specific aim; to create a performance-based meritocracy with a professional system of promotion (Secretaría de Educación Pública,, 1999) .
The newly derived incentive system rewards those teachers who: 1) have all their professional qualifications, 2) demonstrate superior classroom performance, 3) attend inservice training courses or acquire other diplomas, 4) show good relationships with other teachers, parents and students, and 5) have seniority. These material rewards are meaningful, ranging from 27% to 224% of their basic salary, and these benefits accrue for retirement. In addition, teachers have bonuses for Christmas, the "Teachers' Day", and paid vacations. On the average, they make more than 450 days of salary per year in exchange of 200 days of work (four hours a day) in front of a class. Their role and routines are the same as before decentralization, and their responsibilities have not increased significantly.
Almost 65% of all basic education teachers enjoy these benefits, and so far its acceptance is growing within the guilds (Ornelas, 1997b) .
One purpose of the Agreement was to improve overall results. Although nobody knows about quality enhancements because national standardized tests are not for the public record, the efficiency indicators of the system have increased, as can be seen in Table 2 . Another goal of the bundled reforms was to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor states. The same table shows how those asymmetries are gradually diminishing.
For instance, in Nuevo León, the wealthier state --second only to Mexico City--the dropout rate fell from 3.3% in 1988 to 1.7% in 1998 (a difference of 1.6% ). In Oaxaca, the second poorest state, the same indicator improved by 3.3%. The repetition rate dropped 2.4 points in Nuevo León and 4.2 in Oaxaca. From 1988 to 1998, the general efficiency ratio (for many this is the most powerful indicator of equity) raised 10.5 points in Nuevo León and 24 in Oaxaca. The most significant gains came after 1992. The chief explanation for these increases points to the bundled reforms and the compensatory programs. Table 2 
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Issues of Equity
Chapter III of the General Law of Education pictures the aim of a more equitable educational system providing educational opportunities for the economically deprived.
CONAFE, an institution created in 1972 to provide compensatory programs and manage basic education programs in remote zones where formal schooling is scarce or non existent, is now a vigorous institution. While CONAFE plays a minor role in the decentralization of Nuevo León, in Oaxaca it provides services to more than 45-thousand Indian children.
In 1992, as part of the decentralization package, SEP introduced several programs to provide more classroom spaces for the poor, with PARE (Program to Reduce the Educational Backlog) probably the most important. It began in the four poorest states (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Hidalgo) in 1992 and later expanded to another 10 states.
PARE provides incentives to teachers to work in poor and remote rural areas as well as Indian communities. It also furnishes funds for building classrooms and other facilities, prints textbooks and other materials in Indian languages, and provides financial aid to poor students to attend secundarias (secondary schools) outside their communities. More importantly, through the Solidarity program, which now has a new name (Progresa) but few resources, the federal government provides cash and grocery grants for poor students who live in vulnerable areas. This is an important incentive for families to prevent them from making their children work instead of attending school (CONAFE, 1999 ). Yet, these compensatory programs are not sufficient to eliminate the wide gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" --not even in the next 25 or 30 years.
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that even though the poor (but not the poorest) segments of society that enroll their children in public schools are much better off now than before the decentralization reform began, according to recent polls, the Mexican public is not convinced (Ornelas and Alduncin, 1999) .
Local school governance
Chapter VII of the General Law of Education provides the basis for the creation of Councils of Social Participation in Education, constituted by teachers, parents, community leaders, and social organizations. Supposedly, this schema should be organized with interlocking representation in a pyramid fashion from the bottom up. That is, the creation and operation of councils in every school, county, and state in the nation. Finally, the national council must be formed by representatives from each state council, plus outstanding teachers and scholars, and other distinguished representatives of society. The GLE forbids parent associations from being caught up in the details of school management, but must concentrate on larger issues.
Even if SNTE leadership did not oppose formally the creation of such councils, some teacher cadres foresaw an intervention of "extraneous" people in school affairs, which they consider their exclusive terrain. In their Educational Congress of 1994, foreseeing a threat to weaken the teachers' monopoly in school management, SNTE's national leadership dropped the watchword that in case such councils were organized at least half their constituency must be teachers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 1994) . Finally, in September 1999 the SEP organized the national council from the top down, with many authorities as members and yet without defining specific functions. So far, the use of councils as a means of instituting wider participation in educational governance has not been successful.
The School Project was formulated by SEP authorities and piloted in several states, such as Aguascalientes and Guanajuato. It was designed to promote teacher participation in carrying out curricular and organizational reforms, and to induce them to modify traditional teaching practices in order to improve quality. The response of teachers has not been positive as expected because of the tradition of depending on school principals and supervisors. In addition, many of them dislike devoting several hours each month to what they identify as "futile discussions" (Tatto, 1999) . In places like Oaxaca, Section 22 of SNTE boycotts all efforts of authorities to carry out school projects.
Because the School Project design and guidelines come from the center, many state authorities take little interest in this undertaking. Some teachers fear that it will represent a heavy work load, place limits on local school governance, and be an instrument to overrule state sovereignty. To some degree, these fears may be warranted. However, other reports argue that with strong leadership and state involvement, the School Project is a good mechanism to promote teacher participation in school governance (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1999) .
Conclusion
Despite erratic policies and political conflicts, the decentralization of education in Mexico is on the move. Whereas it does not represent a complete devolution to the states of curriculum content, academic evaluation, and quality assessment, through significantly increased management responsibilities, the states are assuming a large measure of influence over education --and it is getting larger. The federal government is continuing to transfer to the states responsibility for additional educational institutions, such as: adult education, technical secondary education (CONALP), and the corporation for school construction.
However, even though the federal government is transferring significant management tasks to the states, the center retains and utilizes its power to define the limits and boundaries to which the states must adhere. The federal government is playing a more dynamic role in policy formation, controlling educational expenditures at the state level, promoting compensatory programs, and helping poor states struggle with the lack of sufficient places for students to attend. Although some recentralization has occurred in the teachers' union since 1992, due to the conflicting forces within SNTE, there are indications that this institution may be about to change its ways and play a different role in the future.
In sum, the Mexican model of decentralization of education appears to work relatively well. The bundling of several reforms has been a key to progress, with the increased financial incentives being the principal driving force. However, to achieve a true federal system (with greater degrees of freedom and most decisions made at the local level) it may take 20 or 25 additional years. For the time being, under the umbrella of the New Federalism, new institutions are springing up all over Mexico. Many states interpret the "silences of the law" as license to play more active roles in devising local solutions to local educational problems. Mexico's drive to decentralize education supports Hanson's assertion that the success or failure of expansive educational reforms depend more on political than technical considerations. (Hanson, 1997, p. 8) .
In the Mexican model of decentralization, politics are in the driver's seat. So far, the central government has been monitoring and controlling the process. However, by placing management authority at the level of the individual state capitals, educational centralism may well have sewn the seeds of its own destruction. The process of educational decentralization has just begun its long march to nobody knows exactly where.
Nevertheless, it is on the move.
